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previously 'sacred' pillars of society. One thinks particularly of the legal profes-
sion. The Government has made extensive use of legislation to achieve social 
change. Much of it has been designed to be used by those in the private sector, 
such as the labor legislation by employers and non-striking workers against 
unions. The effect of this has been to politicize the judiciary, at least in the eyes 
of those who are bearing the brunt of the legislation. This was most clearly seen 
during the miners' strike in 1984. And the legal profession itself, the Bar, has 
recently used the legal system against the Lord Chancellor, one of its own 
members, to seek an annulment of an administrative decision not to increase 
legal aid fees by more than 5 percent. Such willingness to litigate as a means of 
challenging government would recently have been considered unimaginable. 
The second omission of note is any analysis of the Thatcher Government's 
uneasy relationship with its partners in Europe. This relationship has recently 
been strained further by the unique and uncritical support of Mrs. Thatcher 
for American policy towards the Soviet Union and Libya and by her willingness 
to encourage a stronger presence for American multinational corporations in 
Britain at the expense of their European competitors. At issue is Britain's role 
in the international community. Her international effectiveness and future eco-
nomic success is directly tied to that of the European Community: it is vitally 
important that responsibilities to that Community be fulfilled. 
In conclusion, these two books provide a useful and readable introduction to 
the economic aspects of Margaret Thatcher's first term of office. They are by 
no means comprehensive and, by large scale omission, they fail to reflect the 
more painful impact of Thatcherism. 
EVE SPANGLER* 
LAW AND ORDER IN THE NEW GUINEA HIGHLANDS. By ROBERT ]. 
GORDON AND MERVYN]. MEGGIT. University Press of New England, 1985, 283 
pp., appendix, bibliography, index, $35.00. 
Law and Order in the New Guinea Highlands! by Robert]. Gordon and Mervyn 
J. Meggitt is a study of a tribal society - the Enga - where the public peace is 
threatened not by the random stranger-to-stranger violence familiar to western 
urbanites, but by the ravages of inter-tribal and inter-clan warfare. In the 
authors' words: "A climate of suspicion and distrust appears to be a common 
* Associate Professor of Sociology, Boston College. 
1 ROBERT J. GORDON AND MERVYN J. MEGGITT, LAW AND ORDER IN THE NEW GUINEA HIGHLANDS 
(1985). 
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characteristic of loosely structured or acephalous societies, which like the Enga 
espouse a fiercely egalitarian even libertarian ideology."2 In this peculiarly 
tainted atmosphere long known to anthropologists,3 an ideology that stresses 
the good sense of peaceful dispute management co-exists with the reality of 
recurring, and according to Gordon and Meggitt and New Guinean popular 
opinion, accelerating raids and warfare and the absence of any centralized 
authority capable of imposing a lasting peace. 
It was not always thus. When New Guinea was a colony its Australian masters 
were able to impose from above the suspension of tribal warfare, principally 
through the kiap, an agent of the colonial administration. Early expatriate (i.e. 
Australian) kiaps served simultaneously as constables patrolling the countryside, 
as magistrates hearing and resolving disputes, as census-takers and represen-
tatives on behalf of the metropole, as agricultural and forestry extension service 
workers offering valued goods, advice and tools such as salt and steel axes,· as 
labor recruiters, and in almost any other capacity the situation required. Gordon 
and Meggitt trace the decline of the kiaps' effectiveness to the development of 
a more formalized and elaborate colonial administration and to the transition 
to New Guinean independence. In effect, their case study illustrates the process 
of occupational modernization as reflected in the administration of justice. 
The first development toward bureaucratic elaboration, termed "bureaucratic 
entropy" by the authors, 5 stripped the kiap of many of his functions. Agricultural 
work, for example, became the responsibility of agronomists and other experts. 
Most significantly, the kiaps' patrolling and magisterial functions were separated. 
The newly appointed magistrates introduced many of the tensions familiar to 
westerners into the relationship between court and kiap, insisting on the pro-
cedural rights and safeguards characteristic of the western legal tradition. In 
particular, magistrates prohibited the families or property of warriors from 
being seized to prevent warfare or to serve as a bond against the payment of 
fines;6 they also demanded that charges be proven before punishment was 
meted out.7 These procedural changes had enormous political and substantive 
consequences. Politically, "the requirement that a hearing be presided over by 
an outside arbiter implies that a kiap can be wrong and an Enga warrior right; 
it suggests that the warrior can ignore the orders of a kiap or policeman or 
challenge his veracity and get away with it."8 Substantively, the new rules that 
2 [d. at 147. 
3 See R. BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE (1934); T. Schwartz, The Cargo Cult: A Melanesia-type 
Response to Change, in RESPONSE TO CHANGE, (G. Devos ed. 1976). 
4 GORDON AND MEGGITT, supra note I, at 163. 
5 The authors define bureaucratic entropy with this rule: "As the scale of organization increases, 
the amount of waste or non-usable energy increases exponentially." [d. at 66. 
6 [d. at 89. 
7 [d. at 57. 
8 [d. at 56. 
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accorded due process rights to the indigenes sharply curtailed the imposition 
of peace through the exercise of police power. In less than a decade, the 
proportion of acquittals on charges relating to tribal warfare increased from 1 
percent to 59 percent, the number of not-guilty pleas increased from 12 to 53 
percent, and the number of convictions after not-guilty pleas decreased from 
23 to 1 percent.9 In this context the kiaps argued that their peace-keeping 
functions were undermined. The development of law thus proceeded at the 
expense of order and the re-establishment of order would have required the 
suspension of law. 
Australian preparation for New Guinean independence accelerated the gen-
eral erosion of kiap authority cited not only by the authors but also by numerous 
indigenous sources. Pursuant to a new policy, native kiaps replaced Australian 
kiaps. In practice, however, the indigenous kiaps were less able to act authori-
tatively than their Australian predecessors. Accusations of wantokism (loosely, 
nepotism) bedeviled the work of even the most even-handed and "profession-
alized" native kiapS.1O The authors conclude that "the obvious Enga preference 
for expatriate officials is not to be taken as an apologia for earlier Australian 
colonial policy. Rather, it should be understood for what it is: a sensitive popular 
perception of and a dependence on the role of outsiders in dispute management 
in Enga."ll 
I. WE ARE WHAT WE Do 
In discussing the administration of justice as it is produced by the shifting 
occupational agendas of kiaps, magistrates, policemen and local elected officials, 
the sociology of work and occupations would have provided Gordon and Meg-
gitt with a better framework for "relating the part to the whole"12 than they 
find in the study of deviance and social change. 
The study of occupations as one branch of sociology shares in the central 
question of the larger discipline: "How is social order, particularly the modern 
social order, possible?" In comparing modern, that is, industrial, capitalist, 
largely urbanized, societies to non-modern ones, all the major classical theorists 
of the discipline - Marx, Weber, Durkheim13 - have noted the key role 
9Id. at 25. 
10 Id. at 176. 
II Id. at 185. 
12Id. at 41. 
" Marxists see the growing number of occupational specialties as arising from the redesign of jobs 
initiated by owners and intended to de-skill craftsmen. See, e.g., H. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY 
CAPITAL (1974); D. NOBEL, AMERICA BY DESIGN (1977). 
Max Weber focused largely on the unrecognized costs of ordering social relations by "rational" and 
"scientific" standards. He described the rise of bureaucracies (which he termed "the iron cage") as the 
master trend of modern society. Bureaucratization, in turn, gave rise to increasing occupational 
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occupational specialization plays in creating both the material and moral basis 
of modern society. 
From this central insight, three schools of thought derive. The functionalists, 
and most notably Talcott Parsons, speculated about the contributions of various 
occupations to the maintenance of social order.14 According to this school, 
occupations in the justice system were thought to create non-violent means for 
dispute management and to facilitate the rationalization of relationships among 
strangers, rendering them orderly, coherent and predictable. 15 Later, more 
sophisticated functionalists recognized that existing institutional arrangements 
could be dysfunctional as well as functional. They began to notice the more 
repressive features of legal institutions thereby retrieving an insight central to 
Weber's sociology of law l6 and to realize that dispute-resolving mechanisms, 
once in existence, can also be used to prolong or exacerbate disputes. 17 
A second school of sociologists, centered in Chicago under the leadership of 
Everett Hughes, conducted field studies that recorded a world of work signifi-
cantly at variance with the idealistic picture presented by the Parsonian func-
tionalists. ls The Chicago-school ethnographers found a world of sensitive mor-
gue attendants l9 and cynical priests,20 of knowledgeable janitors21 and ignorant 
doctors,22 of cooperative psychiatric patients 23 and manipulative teachers.24 In 
short, Hughes and those influenced by his perspective were able to show that 
there are striking similarities as well as differences among occupations and that 
specialization. See, e.g., M. Weber, Politics as a Vocation and Bureaucracy in FROM MAX WEBER (H. Gerth 
and c.w. Mills eds. 1958). 
Emile Durkheim regarded occupational specialization as a source of both the increasing personal 
freedom and the social disorganization (anomie) characteristic of modern society. He looked to synd-
icalism - the political organization of occupational groups - as a tool for reintegrating society. See, 
e.g., E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1933). 
14 See T. Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in T. PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY (1949). 
15 P. Freund, The Legal Profession, 92 DAEDALUS 689-700 (1963). 
16 M. Weber, supra note 13. For a more recent discussion of the repressive character of legal 
institutions, see, e.g., E. BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY (1970). 
17 For a general discussion of the concept of dysfunction, see R. Merton, Manifest and Latent Functions, 
in R. MERTON, ON THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY (1949). 
18 E. HUGHES, THE SOCIOLOGICAL EYE (Vols. I & 2, 1971). 
19 D. SUDNOW, PASSING ON: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF DYING (1967). 
20 F. Goldner, R. Ritti, T. Ference, The Production of Cynical Knowledge in Organizations 42 A. SOC. 
REv. 539-51 (1977). 
21 R. Gold, In the Basement - the Apartment Buildingjanitor, in THE HUMAN SHAPE OF WORK (P. Berger 
ed. 1964). 
22 There are numerous well-known accounts of physicians' ignorance both of medicine and of each 
other's behavior (which they are mandated to scrutinize); see E. FREIDSON, DOCTORING TOGETHER 
(1975). Even those processes that doctors have established to minimize errors serve more to excuse 
than to prevent mistakes; see C. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER (1979); M. MILLMAN, THE UNKINDEST 
CUT (1977) . 
.. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961). 
24 H. Becker, Educational Organizations and Experiences, in H. BECKER, SOCIOLOGICAL WORK (1970). 
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persons III all occupations have both specialized knowledge and self-serving 
ideologies. This vision has a significant levelling effect. It calls to our attention 
the fact that perhaps occupations differ more in their public image than in their 
actual substance. 25 On a policy level, this insight questions the stigma we attach 
to persons, like the police for example, who do our dirty work,26 or the prestige 
and privilege we grant to those occupations, called professions, that we allow to 
be self-regulating.27 
It is the third school, consisting of Marxist and "power" sociologists, that seeks 
to explain why occupations that have much in common differ greatly in power, 
income, and status; why doctors for example, hold near god-like positions while 
garbage collectors, whose work probably contributes more to the suppression 
of infectious disease, are generally disparaged. 
Central to this school is a vision of wage labor as an inherently conflict-ridden 
relationship between workers and owners, a contested terrain in which each 
party seeks to assert authority over the other.28 Owners try to control workers 
by a variety of technical and social means, and workers, in turn, resist such 
control. Out of this adversarial process emerge forces that account for occu-
pational change. For example, employers both value and fear a high level of 
skill in their labor force. They value it for the obvious reason that it contributes 
to productivity, and they fear it to the degree that it contributes to worker 
intransigence.29 In some instances employers resolve this dilemma through "de-
skilling" - a process in which complex skills are broken down into their com-
ponent parts and each part is assigned to a narrowly specialized worker. This 
strategy produces a class of wage laborers who have less skill and therefore less 
power than the craftsmen they replace. But, if this process curbs craftsmen, it 
also creates relatively privileged positions for those who plan, coordinate and 
supervise the work of others. Thus, if it succeeds, de-skilling establishes a new 
class of managerial employees whose loyalties must be secured and if it fails it 
reduces the labor process to an uncoordinated shambles. 
Much of Gordon and Meggitt's account of occupational development in the 
New Guinean justice system would have benefitted from this labor process 
analysis, despite the fact that this theory evolved from an attempt to explain 
private rather than public sector behavior. Gordon and Meggitt reject studies 
25 Corinne Gilb has documented the role of professional organizations in negotiating occupational 
status in HIDDEN HIERARCHIES (1966). 
26 E. Hughes, Good People and Dirty Work in HUGHES, supra note 18, at 87-97. 
27 It is clear, for example, that the medical community's demand for self-regulation preceded any 
claims to therapeutic efficacy it could legitimately make. See P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); E. BRECHER, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUCS (1972); M. ROTH WALSH, 
DOCTORS WANTED: No WOMEN NEED ApPLY (1977). 
28 See R. EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN (1979). 
29 C. DERBER, PROFESSIONALS AS WORKERS (1982). 
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that "focus on the characteristics of a segment of society in vacuo."30 Instead 
they wish to present an analysis that provides the reader with "an analytic means 
to relate the part to the whole."3! This study fails to relate the part to the whole. 
We are shown how the kiap was rendered increasingly ineffective and how the 
more elaborate occupational system of police, magistrates, agronomists, and 
others that replaced him proved unable to maintain the public peace, yet we 
have no sense of the larger political and economic forces that impinged on the 
New Guineanjustice system. As it stands, this monograph simply relates a series 
of events in a remote society instead of documenting the de-skilling of the kiap 
and subsequent failure to integrate the many specialized occupations of the 
justice system. It is an account that, at best, provides further illustration for 
what we already know: that bureaucracies are cumbersome, rigid and inefficient; 
that they enshrine procedures at the expense of substance; that greater spe-
cialization, if uncoordinated, does not improve the quality of services rendered 
to individual clients or to the community as a whole. At worst, the ethnography 
in this study is peculiarly lifeless, drawing on government commission reports 
and other documents, rather than fieldnotes and interviews. 
II. THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL jUSTICE32 
Perhaps the most interesting contribution Gordon and Meggitt make is their 
account of the growing discussion of the politics of informal justice in the 
highlands. Even so remote a place as New Guinea is not immune to trends in 
intellectual fashion as evidenced by the recent favor found for various forms 
of what western scholars call informal justice and New Guineans call the "cus-
tomary law option." Among the Enga the perceived crisis in law and order 
gradually has led to a criticism of the formal, bureaucratic justice machinery, 
and to a call for a return to "customary law." Here the authors are able to show 
clearly what a peculiar hybrid the "customary law option" actually is. It draws 
much of its legitimacy from the informal justice proponents' preference for 
"substantive and procedural norms that are vague, unwritten, commonsensical, 
flexible, ad hoc, and particularistic."33 Yet it proposes to take precisely such a 
set of informal norms, to record and codify them, and then to use them in the 
formal justice institutions of the New Guinea courts. 
Emerging criticism of the informal justice movement by western scholars 
asserts that institutions ostensibly designed to curb the power of the state and 
to move dispute management closer to the community'S sense of justice, in fact 
30 GORDON AND MEGGITT, supra note 1, at 41. 
'1 [d. 
32 The term derives from the work of R. ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1982). 
33 [d., vol. 1, at 2. 
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accomplish exactly the opposite. State power is expanded when dispute resolving 
institutions scrutinize conflicts, like the problems of barking dogs and spite 
fences too minor to be treated by the more bureaucratic state agencies. The 
proof of expanding state power lies in the fact, noted by one scholar, that 
"informal institutions virtually never dismiss a case. "34 Further, as the case 
proceeds all past behaviors of the plaintiff as well as the defendant are subject 
to scrutiny. This renders inoperative the safeguards implicit in the notion of 
irrelevant or inadmissable evidence and increases the intrusiveness of coercive 
institutions. Thus, government sponsored "informal" justice adds the weight of 
state sanction to such community control mechanisms as gossip and ostracism. 
Finally, once entrenched, powerful forces seem to be at work in informal insti-
tutions causing them to become ever more bureaucratic, professional and for-
malized.35 
To this emerging criticism in the west of informal justice experiments Gordon 
and Meggitt's study adds two specific insights, both supporting the conclusion 
that the differences between western and indigenous law have often been ex-
aggerated. First, the authors argue, it is misleading to compare village dispute 
resolutions to court proceedings in the west. 36 A more appropriate comparison 
between village litigation and the work of lay magistrates would reveal that at 
these lower levels both western and non-western legal processes have many 
informal elements. Second, the authors show, contrary to public perception, 
that even in village disputes customary law often resolves controversies by clearly 
designating winners and losers rather than by reconciling neighbors. 37 Thus 
34 [d. at 271. 
35 At one time, the growth of professions and bureaucracies were thought to be antithetical. This 
hypothesis was rooted in an interpretation of Weber's work that held that the charisma on which 
professions depended was threatened by the routinization that is characteristic of bureaucracies. For 
a discussion of this point, see R. Dingwall, Introduction, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS (R. 
Dingwall & P. Lewis eds. 1983). More recently there has come to be a growing recognition of the 
compatibility of professions and bureaucracies. In this vein, Magali Larson writes: "Both professions 
and bureaucracy belong to the same historical matrix: they consolidate in the early twentieth century 
as distinct but nevertheless complementary modes of work organization." M. LARSON, THE RISE OF 
PROFESSIONALISM, at 199 (1977). Similiarly, Eliot Friedson writes: "For at least a century we have been 
treated to the use of the word 'bureaucracy' as an epithet ... in contrast to the negative word 
'bureaucracy' we have the word 'profession'. This word is almost always positive in its connotation, 
and is frequently used to represent a superior alternative to bureaucracy .... It seems to be assumed 
that technical expertise is ... so self-evidently true as to automatically produce cooperation or obedi-
ence in others as well as the efficient attainment of ends .... But ... the authority of expertise is in 
fact problematic, requiring in its pure ... form the time-consuming and not always successful effort 
of persuading others that its 'orders' are appropriate. As a special kind of occupation, professions 
have attempted to solve the problem of persuasion by obtaining institutional powers and prerogatives 
that at I he very least set limits on the freedom of their prospective clients and that on occasion coerce 
their clients into compliance." E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE, 129-30 (1970). 
36 GORDON AND MEGGITT, supra note I, at 197-98. 
37 !d. at 199. 
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our propensity to overestimate the formality of western justice is matched by 
our tendency to underestimate the formality of customary law. In the end this 
study suggests that the "customary law option" in non-western societies is no 
more likely than the informal justice movement in western ones to be a liberating 
movement that curbs the power of the central authority. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Gordon and Meggitt have conducted a study of dispute management among 
the Enga of New Guinea which illustrates the intersection of occupational 
politics with a crisis in law and order. The authors recommend the rapid 
development of a village court system that, they hope, will provide at a decen-
tralized and accessible level a hybrid of local accountability with the full safe-
guards of a more formal justice system. Their argument parallels the recognition 
arising from the work of E.P. Thompson38 and Richard Abels9 that the safe-
guards of a formal justice system, however clumsily and intermittently used by 
the poor, nevertheless represent a resource that the subordinate classes of 
western societies and the indigenes of non-western ones should be reluctant to 
forego for the questionable benefits of customary and informal law. The authors' 
argument is persuasive to the extent that their discussion echoes other schol-
arship that is only perfunctorily cited. The authors' stated objective - to provide 
a rich ethnographic account of Enga dispute resolution in order to illuminate 
the conflicting Marxist and non-Marxist theories of deviant behavior in devel-
oping societies - fails almost entirely; they do provide, however, an exhaustive 
account, drawn from documentary sources, of the precarious development of 
western justice institutions in Papua-New Guinea. 
38 E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975). 
39 Abel, supra note 32. 
